Convexity and complementarity in network formation. Implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks by Hellmann, Tim
Institute of
Mathematical
Economics
Working Papers
423
November 2009
Convexity and Complementarity in Network
Formation: Implications for the Structure of
Pairwise Stable Networks
Tim Hellmann
IMW · Bielefeld University
Postfach 100131
33501 Bielefeld · Germany
email: imw@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de
http://www.wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de/˜imw/Papers/showpaper.php?423
ISSN: 0931-6558
Convexity and Complementarity in Network
Formation: Implications for the Structure of Pairwise
Stable Networks
Tim Hellmann∗
November 19, 2009
Abstract
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plements (substitutes) in network formation and the implications for the structure
of pairwise stable networks. First, different definitions of convexity (concavity)
in own links from the literature are put into the context of diminishing marginal
utility of own links. Second, it is shown that there always exists a pairwise stable
network as long as the utility function of each player satisfies convexity in own links
and strategic complements. For network societies with a profile of utility functions
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1 Introduction
In the seminal paper of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) the concept of pairwise stability
for the formation of undirected networks is introduced. Since then, pairwise stability
has been the most commonly used notion of stability in the vast growing literature of
network formation. Although pairwise stable networks have been analyzed widely in
different models of network formation, not a lot is understood yet with respect to the
general structure of pairwise stable networks. While imposing a specific functional form
of utility over networks leads to specific results in terms of pairwise stable networks, the
question remains which properties stable networks generally have. Even with respect
to the existence of pairwise stable networks not a lot can be found in the literature.
There are two studies which derive sufficient conditions for existence or uniqueness of
pairwise stable networks. Jackson and Watts (2002b) directly address the question of
existence. They show that the existence of a function similar to a network potential
function is sufficient for ruling out cycles and thus guaranteeing the existence of pairwise
stable networks. A different objective can be found in Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007), in
which they analyze network potentials. However, they show by a corollary of a result by
Jackson and Watts (2002b) that for network societies having an ordinal network potential
function there always exists a pairwise stable network. Both conditions in Jackson and
Watts (2002b) and Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007) are strong, for instance in the case of
Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007), a link between two players needs to be either beneficial to
both or to none.1 In most models of network formation this condition is not satisfied. The
assumption needed in Jackson and Watts (2002b) is similar. Hence, both results require
strong assumptions just to prove existence of pairwise stable networks. Note that both
papers do not present any examples of models from the literature of network formation
which satisfy their assumptions.
In this paper, I also approach the question of existence conditions for pairwise stable
networks. In contrast to previous work, I aim at analyzing the structure of pairwise
stable networks by neither imposing restrictive assumptions such as the existence of an
ordinal potential nor specifying the utility function. Instead, I impose only very natural
conditions on the profile of utility functions such as convexity (concavity) in own links
and strategic complements (substitutes). The former assumption captures that players
have increasing (decreasing) marginal returns from own links, while the latter implies
increasing (decreasing) marginal utility from other players’ links. The notion of convexity
(concavity) respectively strategic complements (substitutes) is not new and has been used
in some models of network formation.2 In Bloch and Jackson (2007), and Calvo´-Armengol
and Ilkilic¸ (2009) convexity (concavity) in own links is defined with respect to marginal
utilities of link deletion. Instead, Goyal and Joshi (2006a) define convexity (concavity)
with respect to link addition. However, in their paper the utility function does not take
into account the whole network structure, but merely focuses on one particular network
statistic, the degree distribution. I generalize their definition of convexity (concavity) and
show an equivalence result for all collected notions of convexity (concavity).
1Definition 7 is required for the result.
2See for instance Bloch and Jackson (2007), Goyal and Joshi (2006a), and Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸
(2009).
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The main result of this paper is that in a network society with a profile of utility functions
which is convex in own links and satisfies the strategic complements property there always
exists a pairwise stable network. This result only requires these very natural assumptions,
and there are several models in the literature of networks formation, in which these are
satisfied. Besides the conditions of convexity and strategic complements, the result does
not rely on any specification or homogeneity of the utility function. Since there are several
examples in the literature, where the conditions of the theorem are satisfied and the
conditions have natural interpretations of non-diminishing marginal utility, the existence
result seems to be more appealing than those which require the existence of a potential-like
function. Furthermore, the implications of concavity and strategic substitutes in network
formation are studied. It is generally not possible to establish a corresponding existence
result as I show by a counterexample. However, concavity and strategic substitutes also
have strong implications for the general structure of pairwise stable networks. In generic
cases, pairwise stable networks are unique for the range of networks that can be reached
by either only adding links or by only deleting links. Generic cases can be ruled out by
either imposing a no-indifference property or simply requiring strict inequalities in the
definition of pairwise stability. Again, the result is of very general nature, since neither
a specification of the utility function nor a homogeneous profile of utility functions is
required. The assumptions of concavity and substitutability are very intuitive: they
resemble non-increasing marginal utility from additional own respectively other players’
links. Several model can be found in the literature of network formation which satisfy
both conditions.
The driving force in these results is that both the effects of additional own and other
players’ links on marginal utility are positive respectively negative. Therefore, we are
not able to establish results of the same generality for the other two combinations, i.e.
convexity and strategic substitutes respectively concavity and complements.
Most closely related to my approach is the work of Goyal and Joshi (2006a). They also use
different combinations of the four conditions convexity and concavity in own links, as well
as, strategic complements and strategic substitutes to obtain existence and uniqueness
results for utility functions that have a particular structure: in Goyal and Joshi’s model,
each player’s utility function only depends on the degree distribution. Moreover, Goyal
and Joshi (2006a) provide qualitative results in terms of special architectures of pairwise
stable networks, which are driven by the particular structure of their utility function. My
approach is more general, since no specification of the utility function is assumed. Even
in this very general framework, I am able to show the effects of the above conditions,
which have strong implications for existence and uniqueness of pairwise stable networks.
Another study which discusses the properties of convexity and concavity in own links
is the paper by Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸ (2009). They use the property to show the
relations between pairwise stability and pairwise Nash stability. Pairwise Nash stability
is defined as the intersection between the set of pairwise stable networks and the set of
networks, which are supported by a Nash equilibrium of the link announcement game
introduced by Myerson (1991).3
3See also Bloch and Jackson (2006) for a definition and a study of relation between different stability
concepts.
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The paper is organized as follows: First, the formal model is presented and several
notions of convexity and concavity are discussed, which can be found in the literature.
I clarify the relation of the ones from the literature and the notion of non-diminishing
(non-increasing) marginal utility from own links and present an equivalence result of all
these definitions. Second, the result of Jackson and Watts (2002b) and other techniques
to exclude the existence of closed improvement cylces are presented and thereby showing
existence of pairwise stable networks. As an implication, I show in Section 4 that the
assumptions of convexity and strategic complements are sufficient to exclude the existence
of closed improvement cylces, which implies by the result of Jackson and Watts (2002b)
the existence of pairwise stable networks. In Section 5, the effects of assuming concavity
and strategic substitutes are analyzed. The main result in this section is that the these
conditions imply a local uniqueness property in generic cases. The final section concludes.
The proofs of all results can be found in the appendix.
2 The Model
Throughout the paper that set of nodes or vertices is assumed to be finite and given by
N = {1, ..., n}. I will refer to nodes of the network as individuals or players. I focus here
on undirected networks, the set of all possible edges of the graph is defined as the set of all
unordered pairs of players of size 2, gN := {K ⊂ N : |K| = 2}. A network is a collection
or a set of edges or links, giving gN the interpretation of the complete network, since it
contains all possible links. The set of all undirected networks can hence be defined as
G := {g : g ⊆ gN}. Given a network g ∈ G, players i and j are directly connected in g, if
the corresponding edge is contained in g, that is {i, j} ∈ g. For short notation, I denote
a link also as (ji =)ij := {i, j}. Individuals have a preference ordering over the set of
networks. For each player, this preference ordering can be presented by a utility function
ui : G → R, with the usual assumptions on the preference ordering.
4 By u =
∏
i∈N ui, I
denote the profile of utility functions. Given the set of all players N , the set of all possible
networks G and the profile of utility functions u, we say that the triple G = (N,G, u)
defines a network society. In a network g ∈ G, the set of neighbors of player i ∈ N is
given by Ni(g) := {j ∈ N : ij ∈ g}. Similarly, Li(g) := {ij ∈ g : j ∈ N} denotes the set
of player i’s links in g. I denote the set of links obtained by deleting player i and all of
his links by L−i(g) := {jk ∈ g : jk 6∈ Li(g)}. Obviously it holds that g = Li(g) ∪ L−i(g)
for all g ∈ G.
When self-interested players form links, one may ask which networks evolve and persist.
While best-responses may also lead to cycles, we want to look for networks that are not
altered by self-interested players. As an analog to equilibrium in non-cooperative Game
Theory these networks are referred to as stable. There are two distinct approaches how
stable networks are defined in the literature. One looks at the link announcement game
defined in Myerson (1991) and uses well-known equilibrium concepts of non-cooperative
Game Theory. The second approach defines desired properties of stability directly on
the set of networks. I introduce here only the well-known concept of pairwise stability
introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).5
4In particular, completeness and transitivity.
5A game theoretic foundation and a comparison of the several definitions of stability can be found in
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Pairwise Stability. A network g is pairwise stable (PS) if no link will be cut by a single
player, and no two players want to form a link:
(i) ∀ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g\ij) and uj(g) ≥ uj(g\ij) and
(ii) ∀ij /∈ g, ui(g ∪ ij) > ui(g)⇒ uj(g ∪ ij) < uj(g).
In words, (i) implies that all links in a pairwise stable network must be beneficial to the
two involved players and (ii) says, that there are no additional links (links not contained
in g) which are beneficial to both players. This definition reflects the behavior of self
interested players who are in control of their links: two players will form a link if it is
beneficial to both, while any single player will reject a link that is not beneficial. Pairwise
stability is a basic notion that can be refined in multiple ways (e.g. unilateral stability,
Buskens and Van de Rijt, 2005; strong stability, Dutta and Mutuswami, 1997; or bilateral
stability, Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2007). Since stability depends on the network society
G = (N,G, u), I denote the set of stable networks, in this case the set of all pairwise
stable networks as PS(G).
For the following the subsequent notation of link addition and link deletion proof networks
adapted from Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007) is useful for the results:
Link Addition Proof Networks. A network g is link addition proof if no two players want
to form a link: ∀ij /∈ g, ui(g ∪ ij) > ui(g)⇒ uj(g ∪ ij) < uj(g).
Link Deletion Proof Networks. A network g is link deletion proof if no link will be cut by
a single player: ∀ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g\ij).
In a link addition proof network no link will be added and in a link deletion proof network
no links will be deleted by self interested (myopic) players. Both conditions simply coincide
with the two conditions of pairwise stability. Let us denote the set of link addition proof
networks by Ga(G) := {g ∈ G | ∀ij ∈ gN \g : mui(g∪ij, ij) > 0 =⇒ muj(g∪ij, ij) < 0},
and the set of link deletion proof networks by Gd(G) := {g ∈ G | ∀ij ∈ g : mui(g, ij) ≥ 0}.
Trivially, a network which is link addition proof and link deletion proof is pairwise stable,
Ga(G) ∩ Gd(G) = PS(G). Furthermore, the empty network is deletion proof, g∅ ∈ Gd,
since there exists no link which can be deleted in the empty network, and analogously the
complete network is link addition proof, gN ∈ Ga.
2.1 Concavity and Convexity in Network Formation
Consider a network society G = (N,G, u) as defined above. The decision to form or
to sever a link typically depends on players’ marginal utility from a given link. If the
marginal utility from a given link positive, the player has an incentive to form that link,
since it provides him with additional positive payoff. Similar considerations hold, when
we consider marginal utilities of sets of links. Depending on a given network g, let us
denote player i′s marginal utility of a set of links currently in network g as mui(g, l) =
ui(g)−ui(g \ l), s.t. l ⊆ g. In words, the marginal utility of a set of links is the difference
Bloch and Jackson (2006).
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of utilities from a given network g containing the set of links l and the network that is
obtained by deleting the set of links l. Similarly we can denote player i′s marginal utility
of a set of new links by mui(g ∪ l, l) = ui(g ∪ l)− ui(g) for l ⊆ g
N \ g.
A common assumption on utility functions in economic theory is convexity or concavity,
representing increasing respectively diminishing marginal utility. Convexity and concav-
ity, however, are defined for functions on an interval in the real numbers. In the model of
bilateral links, the decision variables (the set of own links) are discrete. Thus, it does not
really make sense to speak about the curvature or derivative of the utility function. We
may, however, think about diminishing or increasing marginal utility of a given link with
respect to the set inclusion ordering “⊆”. In the literature on network formation several
definitions of convexity with respect to own links can be found. For instance, Bloch and
Jackson (2007) define the following:
Definition 1 (Bloch and Jackson (2007)). The utility function ui of player i is convex
(concave) in own current links, if ∀g ∈ G and ∀li ⊆ Li(g) the following holds:
mui(g, li) ≥ (≤)
∑
ij∈li
mui(g, ij).
Bloch and Jackson (2007) define convexity in own links with respect to the set of own
links currently contained in a network g. Marginal payoffs from a given set of links already
contained in g should be at least as high as the sum of the marginal payoffs from separate
links. By defining the property on the set of links already in network g, the property of
convexity is defined with respect to link deletion: the marginal utility of deleting the set
l is as least as high as deleting each link contained in l separately from g and summing
over the marginals. Since only deletion is considered, convexity in own current links will
turn out to be equivalent to concavity in link addition as we will see later. Note that
Definition 1 is also given in Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸ (2009) labeled as supermodularity
in own links.6
The natural dual to Definition 1 is to consider link addition instead of link deletion. Calvo´-
Armengol and Ilkilic¸ (2009) define such a property and call it strong submodularity.7
Adapting the definition of Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸ (2009) to our framework, we define
convexity (concavity) in own new links, by simply requiring the property to hold for all
links that can be potentially added instead of requiring it for all links that are already
(currently) contained in g.
Definition 2. The utility function ui of player i is convex (concave) in own new links,
if ∀g ∈ G and ∀li ⊆ Li(g) the following holds:
mui(g ∪ li, li) ≥ (≤)
∑
ik∈li
mui(g ∪ ik, ik).
6Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸ (2009) consider convexity weighted with a factor α. However, taking
α = 1 in their definition of α-supermodularity gives us Definition 1.
7Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸ (2009) again introduce a weight β in their definition, which is omitted
here and also allow for simultaneous link deletion. Note that the use of super- and submodularity is
justified, as can be shown by considering the partial ordering ⊆ on the set of own links Li(g).
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Both notions of convexity (concavity) are defined on different sets and indeed have
different interpretations.8 While the first only considers links that are currently in network
g, the latter considers only potential outside links. By looking more closely at the
definitions, convexity (concavity) in own current links expresses something similar than
concavity (convexity) in own new links: Marginal utility of a given link seems to be non-
increasing (non-decreasing) when adding links. However it is not so clear whether both
definitions are actually equivalent: If so, why would we need different definitions for the
same property? A third definition can be found in Goyal and Joshi (2006a). In Goyal
and Joshi’s model, however, the utility function depends only on the degree distribution.
Hence in their paper, convexity in own links is defined by increasing (decreasing) marginal
utility in the number of own links. Instead of comparing numbers, we adopt their definition
by defining convexity with respect to the set inclusion ordering “⊆”.
Definition 3. A utility function ui of player i is convex (concave) in own links, if ∀g ∈ G,
∀li ⊆ Li(g
N \ g), and ∀ij 6∈ g ∪ li :
mui(g ∪ ij, ij) ≤ (≥)mui(g ∪ li ∪ ij, ij).
This definition exactly represents the intuition of non-diminishing (non-increasing) marginal
utility of a given link from own own links: by adding some own links, the marginal utility
of a given link does not decrease (increase). Equivalently to Definition 3, we may say
that a utility function ui is convex in own links, if for any two networks g, g
′, which
only differ in the links of player i and g ⊆ g′, the marginal utility of adding any link
ij ∈ gN \ g is larger in the g′ than in g, i.e. mui(g ∪ ij, ij) ≤ (≥)mui(g
′ ∪ ij, ij). Writing
the property this way exactly captures what we mean by non-decreasing with respect to
the set inclusion ordering: the marginal utility of a given link in a network g is not larger
than the marginal utility in a g′, which includes g, i.e. g ⊆ g′. I consider this as the most
natural definition of convexity in network formation, since it captures non-diminishing
marginal utility property of utility functions.
Definitions 1, 2, and 3 are all giving a formalization of convexity in network formation.
While the first is defined on the set of links contained in a network, the other two are
defined on the set of links that can potentially be added. Thus, the definitions point into
different directions, i.e. link deletion and link addition. Let us try to organize the three
notions of convexity. Reversing convexity and concavity in Definition 1, the following
result shows that all definitions are equivalent:
Proposition 1. Let ui : G → R the utility function of player i. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
(1) ui is convex (concave) in own links.
(2) ui is convex (concave) in own new links.
(3) ui is concave (convex) in own current links.
The proof can be found in the appendix. The result shows that in fact all three definitions
of convexity are equivalent. Although it may seem odds, let me point out again that
8Subsequently, I show that concavity in own new links is equivalent to convexity in own current links.
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concavity in own current links is equivalent to convexity in own links. The reason is
simply that the definition of concavity in own current links is misleading, since it is
defined on the links already contained in a network. Proposition 1 shows that the
definitions are substitutable, which is used in some of the proofs. Furthermore, the
introduction of Definition 3 helps understand convexity in network formation by thinking
about diminishing marginal utility with respect to own links. Since all three notions are
equivalent, I will thus only refer to convexity in own links, or short convexity, according
to Definition 3.
Up to now, we have defined and discussed the effects of changing own links on the marginal
utility of a given link. Marginal utilities, however, may also be affected by the links of
other players. Again, the marginal utility of a given link can differ significantly, when
other players change links. If the effect of additional links of other players on marginal
utility of a given link is non-negative, then Goyal and Joshi (2006a) speak about strategic
complementarity in network formation. This label is quite natural, since it corresponds
to the definition of complementary goods: here, the goods are the links. However, in
contrast to microeconomic theory or industrial organization the domain of our utility
function is discrete. Thus, we cannot assume differentiability of the utility function. In
order to find a reasonable definition of strategic complementary, we have to consider the
set inclusion ordering ⊆. However, we cannot turn to Goyal and Joshi (2006a) and take
their definition of strategic complements, since in their work the domain of the utility
function is not the network itself, but the number of links. This assumption, however,
is itself quite restrictive: Two networks which have the same number of own and other
players’s links imply the same utility. Thus they define strategic complements respectively
substitutes as increasing marginal utility of a given link in the number of other players
links. Rather, I adapt their definition to our more general class of utility functions by
defining it with respect to set inclusion ordering:
Definition 4. A utility function ui of player i satisfies the strategic complements (substi-
tutes) property, if for all g ∈ G and any set of links l−i ⊆ L−i(g
N \ g) it holds that
mui(g, ij) ≤ (≥)mui(g ∪ l−i, ij). (1)
In words, if the utility function satisfies the strategic complements (substitutes) property
and other players add links such that player i is not involved, then the marginal utility
of a given link does not decrease (increase).
Although both notions of convexity (concavity) and complementarity (substitutability)
may seem restrictive, since both have to hold for the whole set of networks G, we find
many examples in the literature of network formation, which satisfy the properties. I
present some of them subsequently.
3 The Existence of Pairwise Stable Networks
The main focus of this paper is to elaborate on the effects of imposing convexity (con-
cavity) respectively strategic complements (substitutes) in network formation on the
structure of pairwise stable networks. Particularly, we are interested in the implications
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for the existence of these, since existence results in the literature usually require restrictive
assumptions such as the property of network potentials. Rather than potential functions,
I will use here the notions of convexity (concavity) and complementarity (substitutability)
and study their implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks.
In this section, I briefly introduce here the techniques developed in Jackson and Watts
(2002b) to show existence of pairwise stable networks. Some of the existence results
in Jackson and Watts (2002b) are shown by improving paths. An improving path is a
sequence of networks such that each two consecutive networks in the sequence only differ
in one link and the addition (or deletion) of that link is improving for both (one of the
two) involved players. I adapt the formal definition from Jackson and Watts (2002b):
Improving Paths. An improving path from network g to network g′ is a finite sequence of
networks (g1, ..., gK) such that gk ∈ G for all k = 1, ..., K, g1 = g, gK = g
′, and for all
k = 1, ..., K − 1 it holds that either
gk+1 = gk \ ij and ui(gk \ ij) > ui(gk), or
gk+1 = gk ∪ ij and ui(gk ∪ ij) > ui(gk) and uj(gk ∪ ij) ≥ uj(gk).
Thus, given a network gk the next element in an improving path gk+1 is formed either by
one player beneficially cutting a link or by two players creating a link, which is beneficial
to both, reflecting again the idea that two players need to agree about forming a link, but
one player can delete any link by himself. 9 We can trivially observe that a network g is
pairwise stable if and only if there is no improvement path leaving g.
Given the notion of improving paths, Jackson and Watts (2002b) define an (improvement)
cycle C as an improving path (g1, ..., gK) such that g1 = gK . Thus, in an improvement
cycle, players myopically add and cut links but finally arrive at the same network.
Furthermore, Jackson and Watts (2002b) speak about a closed cycle, if for all networks
g ∈ C there does not exists an improving path leading to a network g′ /∈ C. In a dynamic
framework, where players can only add or sever one link at a time and play a myopic
best response, then closed cycles and pairwise stable networks would constitute recurrent
classes: Once a closed cycle is reached, no player will add or cut links that lead to a
network outside the closed cycle.10 Therefore, closed cycles represent something similar
than pairwise stable networks: If we assume myopic players, who can only alter one link
at a time and always play a best response, then once a stable network or a closed cycle
is reached, it will never be abandoned. In a sense, closed cycles are not less stable than
pairwise stable networks.
With these definitions, Jackson and Watts (2002b) get the following important result
stated as a lemma, which I adapt to my framework:
Lemma 1 (Jackson and Watts, 2002b). For any network society G, there exists at least
one pairwise stable network or a closed cycle of networks.
9Implicitly it is assumed here that players are myopic: when adding or severing a link they do not
take into account the final network in the sequence, but only see the myopic improvement. If we assume
farsighted behavior, then individuals do not compare two consecutive elements of the sequence, but rather
the current network to the resulting network. For a study on farsighted behavior, see Page (2004).
10See Jackson and Watts (2002a) for such a setup and the observation that pairwise stable networks
and closed cycles are the only recurrent classes.
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In Jackson and Watts (2002b) and in Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007) this lemma is used
to show existence of a pairwise stable network. Both papers show in a similar fashion
that a network society with a utility function, which has an ordinal potential, implies
non-existence of cycles, and hence the existence of pairwise stable networks by Lemma 1.
I will use the same technique to show the existence result in Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 implies that one way to proof existence of pairwise stable networks is to show
non-existence of closed cycles. With the property of ordinal potentials however, it is
shown in both works of Jackson and Watts (2002b) and Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007)
that no cycles exist. However, to show existence of pairwise stable networks, we do not
need to rule out cycles, just closed cycles. The following lemma shows conditions under
which closed cycles fail not exist:
Lemma 2. Suppose an improvement cycle C either that does not contain
• a link addition proof network, i.e ∀g ∈ C =⇒ g /∈ Ga, or
• a link deletion proof network, i.e ∀g ∈ C =⇒ g /∈ Gd.
Then C cannot be a closed cycle.
The proof is straightforward and presented in the appendix. If a cycle does not contain
a link addition proof network, then it cannot be closed, since there always exists an
improving path to a link addition proof network. This is trivial, since we can always
add links in a non-link addition proof network. Thus there exists an improving path
to either the complete network (which is link addition proof) or another link addition
proof network. But we assumed that a link addition proof network is not part of the
improvement cycle. Since we have constructed an improvement path leading out of the
cycle, the cycle cannot be closed. The second part is shown analogously.
The lemma is helpful for proving the main result. In the proof of Theorem 1, I show that
no addition proof network can be part of any improvement cycle, ruling out the existence
of closed cycles and thus implying the existence of pairwise stable networks.
4 Convexity and Strategic Complements
In this part, I show the implications for the existence of pairwise stable networks, if a pro-
file of utility functions satisfies the assumptions of convexity and strategic complements.
Recall, that convexity in own links means that the marginal utility from a given link is
non-decreasing when adding other own links. In other words, the returns from own links
are non-decreasing with respect to the set inclusion ordering. The assumption of strategic
complements refers to the effects of additional links of other players on marginal utility.
The incentive (marginal utility) to form a given link is non-decreasing when other players
add links. The effects of both adding own and other players links are non-negative for
the incentive to form a given link. The main result for a network society such that the
profile of utility functions satisfies convexity in own links and the strategic complements
property is that there always exists a pairwise stable network. The intuition behind this
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result, presented in Theorem 1, is the following: if a network g is link deletion proof, then
any improvement from g can only involve the addition of links. In an improving path,
a successor of a link deletion proof network g is again link deletion proof since marginal
utilities of all current (and new) links have not decreased, if convexity and strategic
complements are satisfied. Continuing in this manner a pairwise stable networks has to
be reached eventually. In other words, no cycle can contain a deletion proof network since
otherwise it cannot be a cycle. The following result summarizes this intuition.
Lemma 3. Let G be a network society and suppose that u satisfies the strategic comple-
ments property and convexity in own links. Then:
(1) No link addition proof network g ∈ Ga can be part of an improvement cycle.
(2) No link deletion proof network g ∈ Gd can be part of an improvement cycle.
The proof is presented in the appendix. Convexity and strategic complements imply
that adding links to a deletion proof network does not decrease the marginal utility of
a given link since the effects of own links and the effects of other links are non-negative
on marginal utility. Thus, once a link deletion proof network is reached, any improving
path emanating from it only involves link addition. Hence, an improvement cycle cannot
contain a link deletion proof network since otherwise it cannot be a cycle (since no links
will ever be deleted). Analogous considerations hold for link addition proofness. The
following theorem summarizes the results obtained in Lemma 1-3.
Theorem 1. Suppose a profile of utility functions u = (u1, ..., un) of a network society G
satisfies the strategic complements property and convexity in own links. Then:
(1) There does not exist a closed improvement cycle.
(2) There exists a pairwise stable network.
The theorem is an immediate implication of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. The proof of
Theorem 1 is thus omitted since by Lemma 3 no addition proof network can be part of
any improvement cycle in a network society G with a profile of utility functions which
satisfies convexity and strategic complements. Then, Lemma 2 implies that there does
not exist a closed cycle, implying part (1) of Theorem 1. By the result of Jackson
and Watts (2002b) (see Lemma 1) we get thus existence of pairwise stable networks.
This result shows that convexity and strategic complements are indeed sufficient for the
existence of pairwise stable networks. Particularly appealing is generality of the result,
and Theorem 1 is therefore in the spirit of the existence results of Jackson and Watts
(2002b) and Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007). However, the assumptions imposed here
seem more intuitive and less restrictive, as they simply reflect non-diminishing marginal
utility. Furthermore, they are easy to check and instead of the papers above, I can easily
find models in the literature which satisfy the assumptions of convexity and strategic
complements. Among them is the model of “Provision of a Pure Public” by Goyal and
Joshi (2006a), presented subsequently.
By simply requiring the properties of convexity and strategic complements, we thus arrive
at a general result: there always exists a pairwise stable network. In some models
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of network formation these properties result from the setup in the model and I will
subsequently present an example from the literature which satisfies the assumption. In
general, however, a more natural assumption on the utility function is concavity, i.e.
diminishing marginal utility together with substitutability. These are models, where
additional (own and other) links decrease the incentive to form (the marginal utility
of) a given link, i.e. links are substitutable. These assumptions will be discussed in the
next subsection. Let us look at a network formation model taken from Goyal and Joshi
(2006a).
Example 1 (Goyal and Joshi (2006a), Provision of a Pure Public Good). In this model
there are n players choosing an output level xi (second stage) to produce a public good
which is valuable for everybody p˜ii(x) =
∑
i∈N xi. Players can collaborate (first stage)
and share their knowledge about production of the public good, which reduces the marginal
costs of producing the output, but is costly with c > 0. The marginal costs of producing
the public good is given by fi(xi, g) =
1
2
( xi
di(g)+1
)2, for all i ∈ N , where di represents player
i’s degree, i.e. di(g) = |Li(g)|.
Given di(g), player i’s maximization problem at the second stage is thus maxxi∈R+xi +∑
j∈N\i xj −
1
2
( xi
di(g)+1
)2. This implies optimal output of x∗i (g) = (di(g) + 1)
2. Hence, in
equilibrium every player chooses optimal output x∗i (g) for all i ∈ N , yielding the utility
function
uPGi (g) =
1
2
(di(g) + 1)
2 +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(dj(g) + 1)
2 − cdi(g),
where the first term is the difference of own (equilibrium-) output and production costs,
the second term is the (equilibrium-) output of all other agents, and the last term is the
costs of collaboration. Marginal utility of a given link ij satisfies
muPGi (g ∪ ij, ij) = 9/2 + di(g) + 2dj(g)− c.
Thus, marginal utility of a given link is increasing in both di and dj, implying convexity
and strategic complements.
The reason that the “Provision of a Pure Public” model satisfies convexity and strategic
complements is primely due to the structure of marginal cost of producing the output:
an additional link lowers marginal costs quadratically, hence increasing optimal output
quadratically. Since the utility function is linear in own and other player’s public good
output, we get convexity in of own links and strategic complements.
5 Concavity and Strategic Substitutes
In many models of network formation the effects of own and other players’ links on
marginal utility are just the other way around: marginal utility is decreasing in own links
and links are substitutes rather than complements. This is also more intuitive if we think
about markets and goods. A common assumption in economic theory is diminishing
marginal utility. The more an individual consumes the less valuable is an additional
consumption good. This is also natural if we think about network formation: we find
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many models and I present some of them in this Chapter, where concavity in own links is
satisfied instead of convexity. Here concavity and substitutability, again, have a common
interpretation: the effects of additional own and other players’ links on marginal utility of
any given link are non-positive, in other words, links are substitutable. This is especially
true in models where connectivity to other players matters, i.e. models where the utility
function is decreasing in distances to other players, such as the connections model.11
In the case of network society such that convexity and strategic complements are satisfied,
there always exists a pairwise stable network. This is not true anymore in the case of
concavity and substitutability. Consider the following example, which is kept as simple as
possible to show that even though both substitutability and convexity are satisfied, there
does not exist a pairwise stable network.
Example 2. Let G = (N,G, u) such that N = {1, 2, 3}. Suppose that mui(ij, ij) > 0
for all i, j ∈ N , meaning that any player wants to form a link to any other player in the
empty network. Furthermore, in the complete network any player wants to delete links:
mui(g
N , ij) < 0 for all i, j ∈ N , implying also that no player wants to form an additional
link, when two links are already in the network. In the case of two links, let the marginals
of current links satisfy:
network player 1 player 2 player 3
g = {12, 13} mu1({12, 13}, 13) > 0 mu2({12, 13}, 12) < 0 mu3({12, 13}, 13) > 0
g = {12, 23} mu1({12, 23}, 12) > 0 mu2({12, 23}, 12) > 0 mu3({12, 23}, 23) < 0
g = {13, 23} mu1({13, 23}, 13) < 0 mu2({12, 23}, 23) > 0 mu3({12, 23}, 23) > 0
Suppose now, that the utility functions satisfies the above conditions on the marginals.
With these assumptions only, it is easy to see that there does not exist a pairwise stable
network. This is illustrated Figure 1.
The networks presented in Figure 1 form a closed cycle. Hence, none of those can be
pairwise stable. Note that the only networks not shown in Figure 1 are the empty and
the complete network which are trivially on an improving path to the closed cycle C, and
therefore not stable, since mui(ij, ij) > 0 and mui(g
N , ij) < 0 for all i, j ∈ N .
I show now, that one can easily construct a utility function satisfying concavity and
strategic substitutes and the above assumptions on the marginals. Consider, for instance,
the following profile of utility functions, such that ui(g
∅) = 0 and ui(g
N) = −1 for all
i ∈ N , ui(ij) = 2, and uk(ij) = 1 forall k, i, j ∈ N such that k 6= i, j. Furthermore, for
|g| = 2 it holds that uj(ij, jk) = 3 for all i, j, k ∈ N and u2(12, 13) = 0 and u3(12, 13) = 2,
u1(12, 23) = 2 and u3(12, 23) = 0, and u1(13, 23) = 0 and u2(13, 23) = 2. It is easy to
check that this particular utility function satisfies the above assumption on the marginals
as well as concavity and strategic substitutes. Consider, for instance player 1. Calculating
the marginal utilities for the above specified utility function gives:
mu1({12}, 12) > mu1({12, 13}, 12), mu1({12, 23}, 12) > mu1(g
N , 12),
mu1({13}, 13) > mu1({12, 13}, 13), mu1({13, 23}, 13) > mu1(g
N , 13),
11Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸ (2009) show that the homogeneous connections model satisfies concavity
in own links. A more general proof is given in Bu¨chel and Hellmann (2009) for the heterogeneous
connections model.
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Figure 1: The closed cycle C of networks of Example 2
implying that concavity is satisfied for player 1. Furthermore, since
mu1({12}, 12) > mu1({12, 23}, 12), mu1({12, 13}, 12) > mu1(g
N , 12)
mu1({13}, 13) > mu1({13, 23}, 13), mu1({12, 13}, 13) > mu1(g
N , 13),
the strategic substitutes property is satisfied. Moreover, it is easy to see that the marginal
utilities satisfy the conditions above. Analogous considerations hold for the other two
players. Hence, there does not exist a pairwise stable network, although the profile of
utility functions satisfies concavity and substitutes.
Generally, Example 2 shows that existence of a pairwise stable network is not guaranteed
in a network society with a profile of utility functions satisfying concavity and strategic
substitutes. In other words, these conditions are not sufficient for the existence of pairwise
stable networks. Lemma 1 states that non-existence of a pairwise stable network implies
existence of a closed cycle. This is of course true in Example 2. However, one should
not be misled and suppose that convexity and strategic substitutes are sufficient for the
existence of a closed cycle. It is easy to see that existence of a closed cycle is generally
not guaranteed: consider, for instance, a network society with a profile of utility functions
such that own and other players’ links do not have an effect on marginal utilities, i.e.
mui(g, ij) = mui(g
′, ij) for all g, g′ ∈ G and for all ij ∈ gN . Here, both concavity
and convexity together with strategic substitutes and strategic complements are satisfied.
Thus, by Theorem 1 there does not exist a closed cycle, although strategic substitutes
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and concavity are satisfied. This will also be true for generic cases since altering the
marginals a little bit will not necessarily lead to different results. Thus, we can neither
guarantee existence of pairwise stable networks nor existence of closed cycles, when the
utility function only satisfies concavity and strategic substitutes.
The existence results for network societies with a profile of utility functions satisfying
concavity and strategic substitutes are negative. However, the assumptions put some
structure on the incentives of players, which may thus be helpful deriving some general
properties of stable networks and improving paths in cases where concavity and strategic
substitutes are satisfied. By Lemma 2, we got that any deletion (addition) proof network
can only have a successor in an improving path that is again deletion (addition) proof, if
convexity ans strategic complements are satisfied, which was the main idea to show the
existence of pairwise stable networks. However, the effects of own and other players’ links
are just the other way around if we have concavity and strategic substitutes. Thus, for a
deletion proof network in an improving path involving only link addition the predecessor
needs also be deletion proof. This is expressed in the following result.
Lemma 4. Let there be a network society G such that u satisfies the strategic substitutes
property and concavity in own links. Then the following holds:
(1) If a network g ∈ G is link deletion proof, then all networks g′ ⊆ g are link deletion
proof, g′ ∈ Gd.
(2) If a network g ∈ G is link addition proof, then all networks g′ ⊇ g are addition
proof, g′ ∈ Ga.
The proof is straightforward and presented in the appendix of this chapter. However,
the assertion is strong. Any subnetwork of a deletion proof network is deletion proof and
any supernetwork of an addition-proof network is addition proof. Thus, the improving
path result in Lemma 2 is just reversed in the case of concavity and strategic substitutes:
a link addition proof network that is reached in an improving path by deleting a link
has a predecessor which is addition proof. In Lemma 2, where convexity and strategic
complements are satisfied each link addition proof network (if it is not pairwise stable)
has a successor in an improving path that is link addition proof.
Lemma 4 has some trivial implications: since any supernetwork (subnetwork) of a link
addition (deletion) proof network is link addition (deletion) proof, all networks are link
addition (deletion) proof if the empty (complete) network is link addition (deletion) proof.
Of course in this case the empty (complete) network is pairwise stable. Hence, there
cannot exist any cycle since all other networks are link addition (deletion) proof in that
case.
Furthermore, note that a pairwise stable network g is both link deletion proof and link
addition proof. Thus, by Lemma 4 any supernetwork of pairwise stable network g needs
to be addition proof and any subnetwork of g needs to be deletion proof. Therefore,
Lemma 4 suggests that in generic cases there may be no super- or subnetworks of a
pairwise stable network g which are also pairwise stable. The intuition is the following:
suppose there exists another pairwise stable network g′ and suppose g ( g′. Since any
subnetwork of g′ (since g′ is pairwise stable) is link deletion proof and any supernetwork
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of g (since g is pairwise stable) is link addition proof, this immediately implies that all g˜
such that g ⊆ g˜ ⊆ g′ are also pairwise stable. To exclude this non-generic case consider
the following definition adapted from Jackson and Watts (2002b).12
Definition 5 (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). The utility function ui of player i exhibits
no indifference if for all g ∈ G and for any link ij ∈ Li(g
N \ g) the following holds:
ui(g) 6= ui(g ∪ ij).
It is clear that in case of no indifference and concavity and strategic substitutes the above
described case cannot occur since otherwise any network in between both networks is
stable and thus some players are indifferent between pairwise stable networks, which is
excluded by Definition 5. The following result summarizes this intuition.
Theorem 2. Let G be a network society and suppose u satisfies the strategic substitutes
property, concavity in own links, and exhibits no indifference. Then:
(1) If g is pairwise stable, then for all g′ ⊂ g and for all g′ ⊃ g it holds that g′ 6∈ [PS(G)].
(2) If gN is pairwise stable, then there exists no other pairwise stable network.
(3) If g∅ is pairwise stable, then there exists no other pairwise stable network.
As usual the proof can be found in the appendix of this chapter. Note that in the proof
the no-indifference property is only needed locally, i.e. only needed for the pairwise
stable networks. We could similarly put a slightly stronger assumption on the pairwise
stable networks, requiring muk(g ∪ ij, ij) < 0 for at least one k ∈ {i, j} instead of
mui(g ∪ ij, ij) > 0 =⇒ muj(g ∪ ij, ij) < 0 as property (ii) in the definition of pairwise
stability. With that notion we would have the same statement with weaker requirements
since if u satisfies the no-indifference property, then for any pairwise stable network we
have muk(g ∪ ij, ij) < 0 for at least one k ∈ {i, j}. Thus, the no-indifference property
(or weaker: the adjusted pairwise stability concept) rules out the non-generic case, where
players are indifferent between a pairwise stable network and an adjacent network.
Hence, rather than existence of pairwise stability we get a uniqueness result in case
of concavity and strategic substitutes together with no indifference: a pairwise stable
network g (if it exists) is “locally” unique, there exists no other pairwise stable network
which contains g or is contained in g. In other words, there exists no other pairwise stable
network which can be attained by only adding respectively only deleting any set of links
from g. Since G together with the set inclusion ordering ⊆ is a partially ordered set,
local uniqueness can also be interpreted the following way: if a network g ∈ G is pairwise
stable, then for any network g′ ∈ G such that g and g′ are ordered by the bilateral relation
⊆ it holds that g′ is pairwise stable if and only if g′ = g. Furthermore, if the complete or
the empty network is stable, then it is the only stable network.
As mentioned in the beginning there are several models of network formation in the
literature which satisfy the assumptions of concavity and strategic substitutes. Consider
the following model, taken from Goyal and Joshi (2006a).
12At first glance, the definition in Jackson and Watts (2002b) seems different from Definition 5.
However, both are equivalent as one can easily verify.
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Example 3 (Goyal and Joshi (2006a), Friendships Networks). In the friendship model,
there are n individuals who derive utility from social interaction. Individuals can form
friendships and their utility is increasing in the number of friends and the time each
individual is able to spend with his friends. Each player has a fixed amount of time
available and allocates it equally among his friends. One representation by a utility
function capturing the above described setting is given by:
ui(g) =
√
di(g) +
∑
j∈Ni(g)
1
dj(g)
,
resembling the above assumptions. Here, again, di(g) := |Li(g)| is the number of player
i′s links, also called degree. The marginal utility of a given link can be calculated:
mui(g ∪ ik, ik) =
√
di(g) + 1−
√
di(g) +
1
dk(g)
.
Therefore, mui(g∪ik, ik) is decreasing in own degree and thus in own links and decreasing
in player k’s degree and thus non-increasing in other players’ links. Hence, concavity and
strategic substitutes are satisfied.
Other examples, satisfying the properties of concavity and strategic substitutes are the
Free-Trade-Agreements-Model by Goyal and Joshi (2006b) and the Patent Races Model by
Goyal and Joshi (2006a). Therefore, as a concluding remark of the discussion of networks
societies with a profile of utility functions satisfying concavity and strategic substitutes,
we see that these properties are satisfied in many models in the literature and hence can
be seen as very natural and intuitive properties.
6 Other Properties Sufficient for the Existence of
Pairwise Stable Networks
I have analyzed, so far, the effects of convexity and strategic complements respectively
concavity and substitutes on the structure of pairwise stable networks. The other two
combinations, i.e. convexity and strategic substitutes respectively concavity and strategic
complements, can also be found in some models in the literature, and depending on the
interpretation can also be very intuitive. However in these combinations, the effects of
own and other players’ links on marginal utility point into different directions. This makes
it difficult to find results concerning existence or to say something meaningful about the
general structure of pairwise stable networks. Hence the analysis of these combinations
is omitted here. Rather, I present here some properties that also guarantee existence of
pairwise stable networks.
First, imagine that other players’ linking behavior has no effect on the marginals. This is
the case when the utility function satisfies both strategic substitutes and strategic com-
plements. Hence, own incentives to form links are not effected by other links. However,
with just these two properties we cannot exclude cycles or guarantee existence of pairwise
stable networks since the name or the labels of the players could potentially matter. If
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these labels do not matter, the only characteristic of a network that influences the utility
is the number of own links, in other words the own degree. Let us first define formally
the property that we just described in words that labels of players do not matter for the
incentives.
Definition 6. The utility function ui of player i in a network society G satisfies anonymity
in marginal utilities if for all j, k ∈ N and for all g such that Nj(g) = Nk(g), it holds that
mui(g ∪ ij, ij) = mui(g ∪ ik, ik). (2)
In this definition the marginal utility to connect to two players j and k, who have equal
network positions, i.e. two players which are symmetric, in a given network g, is equal.
Two players j and k have equal network position if the permutation pi : N → N such
that pi(i) = i for all i 6= {j, k} and pi(j) = k, does not change the network, hence g = gpi.
It is easy to see that two players j and k have equal network positions if and only if
Nj(g) = Nk(g). Hence, the definition exactly captures that links to equals have the same
marginal utility. Together with the strategic complements and substitutes property, we
get existence of pairwise stable networks.
Proposition 2. Let G be a network society and suppose that u satisfies both the strategic
complements and substitutes property and suppose anonymity is satisfied. Then:
(1) For any i ∈ N such that g−i = g
′
−i and di(g) = di(g
′) it holds that ui(g) = ui(g
′).
(2) There does not exist a closed cycle of networks.
(3) There exists a pairwise stable network.
A profile of utility function satisfying both the strategic complements and substitutes
property implies that links of other players have no effect on marginal utility of a given
link. Note that this does not imply non-existence of externalities,13 which captures the
effects on absolute utility. Together with anonymity in marginal utilities the assumptions
of strategic complements and substitutes implies existence of pairwise stable networks.
The intuition behind this result is that other players’ links do not matter for the decision
of a single player. Since labels of players do not matter, no player cares of whom to
connect to and thus only optimizes the number of links. A similar result is shown by
Bu¨chel (2009). Bu¨chel shows that if the utility function only depends on own degree,
such that ui(g) = u˜i(di(g)), then there always exist a pairwise stable network.
I discussed the (strong) assumption of pairwise sign compatibility (PSC) by Chakrabarti
and Gilles (2007) briefly in the beginning. It requires that any link is either beneficial
to both or to none of the involved players. This assumption especially implies that no
disagreement about the formation of a given link between two myopic players is possible.
Definition 7 (Chakrabarti and Gilles, 2007). A profile of utility functions u satisfies
pairwise sign compatibility (PSC) if for all g ∈ G and for all links ij ∈ g it holds that:
sgn (mui(g, ij)) = sgn (muj(g, ij)) .
13See for instance Bu¨chel and Hellmann (2009) for a definition of externalities in network formation
and the implications for the tension between stability and efficiency
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In the existence result of Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007) pairwise sign compatibility among
other properties is required to show the existence result. Pairwise sign compatibility is
also implicitly assumed in the existence result of Jackson and Watts (2002b). Thus, we
could imagine that together with our properties on the utility function, we are able to
establish an even stronger result.
Proposition 3. Let G be a network society and suppose that u satisfies PSC, anonymity
and the strategic complements property. Then either the empty network or the complete
network is pairwise stable. Furthermore, if no indifference is satisfied, then one of those
is uniquely pairwise stable.
With these strong conditions of PSC, anonymity and the strategic complements, we get
also strong results: the empty network and the complete network are the only candidates
for stability and at least one of them is pairwise stable. No indifference additionally
ensures that exactly one of them is stable. Although the assumptions in this result are
strong, let me emphasize that the utility function is not specified. The results only
depend on the general assumptions. Let us take a look at one more property taken from
the literature. Besides convexity in own links that has been analyzed extensively in this
chapter, Bloch and Jackson (2007) define also a stronger property, namely convexity all
links.
Definition 8 (Bloch and Jackson, 2007). The utility function ui is convex (concave) in
all links if ∀i ∈ N , ∀g ∈ G, ∀l ∈ gN \ g, and ∀jk 6∈ g ∪ l :
mui(g ∪ jk, jk) ≤ (≥)mui(g ∪ l ∪ jk, jk).
The convexity property in this definition trivially includes convexity in own links according
to Definition 3. Moreover it includes the effects of other players links in a non-negative
fashion. Thus the following result is obvious.
Lemma 5. Let G be a network society and suppose that u satisfies convexity (concavity)
in all links. Then,
(1) u is convex (concave) in own links.
(2) u satisfies the strategic complements (substitutes) property.
Since the definition of convexity in all links implies convexity in own links and the strategic
complements property, we can immediately conclude that a network society with a profile
of utility functions satisfying convexity in all links possesses a pairwise stable network by
Theorem 1. In fact, convexity in all links is stronger than convexity in own links and
complementarity, as one can easily check.
This concluding section collects some definitions taken from the literature that are suf-
ficient for existence. However, most of the assumptions are very strong. Hence, this
part is kept very brief and can be seen as an extension to the analysis of the more natural
properties that only include the effects of own and other players’ links on marginal utilities.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have studied conditions which are sufficient for the existence of pairwise
stable networks. I have focused on definitions which seem quite natural and are widely
used in economics and network formation: convexity and concavity, describing the effects
of own links on marginal utility, and complementarity and substitutability representing
the effects of other players links on marginal utility. In the case of convexity and concavity
several definitions can be found in the literature. All of them are equivalent, and I put
them into relation of non-diminishing and non-increasing marginal utilities with respect
to the set inclusion ordering.
In the main result of this chapter it is shown that the properties of convexity and
complementarity are sufficient for the existence of pairwise stable networks. Past studies
needed strong and restrictive assumptions to derive sufficient conditions for the existence
of pairwise stable networks and were not able to find models in the literature satisfying
the assumptions. The properties of convexity and complementarity, however, can be
found in some models of which I presented one example here. An even more intuitive
assumption on the utility function is concavity and substitutability representing non-
increasing marginal utility. These conditions are, however, not sufficient for existence of
pairwise stable networks. Instead, conditional on existence, pairwise stable networks are
locally unique: in generic cases, there exists no other network that can be reached by
link addition or link deletion which is pairwise stable. Again, many network formation
models from the literature can be found satisfying the assumptions of concavity and
substitutability.
A particular feature of this study is the generality of the analysis. The utility function
is not specified, it is only restricted to natural settings which are not strong as many
models in the literature share them. The contribution of this paper to the network
formation literature is three-fold. First, the notion of convexity and concavity is clarified
and definitions in the literature are organized. Second, I am able to establish an existence
result only depending on very natural settings compared to past work. Third, the results
elaborate on the general structure of pairwise stable networks. Some of them may help
characterize pairwise stable networks in different models of network formation, using e.g.
the uniqueness result.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1.
(1)⇒ (2) Suppose that for a player i ∈ N , ui is convex (concave) in own links. I show that then
ui is also convex in own new links, i.e. mui(g∪li, li) ≥
∑
ij∈li
mui(g∪ij, ij) for every
g ∈ G, and for any set of own new links li ⊆ Li(g
N\g). Let g ∈ G and li ⊆ Li(g
N\g).
Since any network is a set of single links, li can also be written as li = {ij1, ..., ijm}.
By definition of marginal utility we get mui(g ∪ li, li) = ui(g ∪ li) − ui(g). We can
add zeros and rearrange the summation to get:
mui(g ∪ li, li) = ui(g ∪ li)− ui(g)
= ui(g ∪ li)− ui(g ∪ li \ ij1) + ui(g ∪ li \ ij1)
−ui(g ∪ li \ (ij1 ∪ ij2)) + ui(g ∪ li \ (ij1 ∪ ij2))− ...
−ui(g ∪ li \ {
m−1
∪
k=1
ijk}) + ui(g ∪ li \ {
m−1
∪
k=1
ijk})− ui(g)
=
m∑
x=1
(
ui(g ∪ li \ {
x−1
∪
k=1
ijk})− ui(g ∪ li \ {
x
∪
k=1
ijk})
)
(3)
We can now apply convexity in own links by leaving out the links li \ {
x
∪
k=1
ijk} in
every summand and get:
m∑
x=1
(
ui(g ∪ li \ {
x−1
∪
k=1
ijk})− ui(g ∪ li \ {
x
∪
k=1
ijk})
)
≥
m∑
x=1
(ui(g ∪ ijx)− ui(g))
=
∑
ij∈li
(ui(g ∪ ij)− ui(g)) =
∑
ij∈li
mui(g ∪ ij, ij),
implying convexity in own new links, since li and g, where chosen arbitrarily.
(1)⇒(3) This step can be shown analogously to step 1. Suppose that for a player i ∈ N , ui
is convex in own links. I show that then ui is also concave in own current links, i.e.
mui(g, li) ≤
∑
ij∈li
mui(g, ij) for every g ∈ G, and li ⊆ Li(g).
Let g ∈ G and li ⊆ Li(g). We can write li as a list of its links, li = {ij1, ..., ijm}. By
definition of marginal utility we get mui(g, li) = ui(g)− ui(g \ li). Similar to step 1,
I add zeros and rearrange the summation to get:
mui(g, li) = ui(g)− ui(g \ li)
= ui(g)− ui(g \ ij1) + ui(g \ ij1)− ui(g \ (ij1 ∪ ij2)) + ui(g \ (ij1 ∪ ij2))
−...+ ...− ui(g \ {
m−1
∪
k=1
ijk}) + ui(g \ {
m−1
∪
k=1
ijk})− ui(g \ li)
=
m∑
x=1
(
ui(g \ {
x−1
∪
k=1
ijk})− ui(g \ {
x
∪)
k=1
ijk})
)
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By convexity in own links, adding a set of links increases the marginal utility of a
given link. Thus, adding {
x−1
∪
k=1
ijk} to the network g \ {
x−1
∪
k=1
ijk} in every summand
yields higher marginals:
m∑
x=1
(
ui(g \ {
x−1
∪
k=1
ijk})− ui(g \ {
x
∪)
k=1
ijk})
)
≤
m∑
x=1
(ui(g)− ui(g \ ijx))
=
∑
ij∈li
(ui(g)− ui(g \ ij)) =
∑
ij∈li
mui(g, ij),
implying concavity in own current links, since g ∈ G and li ⊆ Li(g) where chosen
arbitrarily.
(2)⇒(1) Now, suppose ui is convex in own new links. By Definition 2 it holds for all g ∈ G
and for any set of own links li ⊆ Li(g
N \ g) that:
mui(g ∪ li, li) ≥
∑
ij∈li
mui(g ∪ ij, ij) (4)
Applying (4) to a set of own links l¯i ⊆ Li(g
N \ g) of size two, e.g. l¯i = {ik, il} for
some links ik, il ∈ Li(g
N \ g), implies:
mui(g ∪ ik ∪ il, ik ∪ il) ≥ mui(g ∪ ik, ik) +mui(g ∪ il, il), (5)
for all g ∈ G, and for any two links ik, il ∈ Li(g
N \ g). By equivalently rearranging
equation (5) we get:
⇔ ui(g ∪ ik ∪ il)− ui(g) ≥ ui(g ∪ ik)− ui(g) + ui(g ∪ il)− ui(g)
⇔ ui(g ∪ ik ∪ il)− ui(g ∪ il) ≥ ui(g ∪ ik)− ui(g)
⇔ mui(g ∪ il ∪ ik, ik) ≥ mui(g ∪ ik, ik) (6)
This holds again for all g ∈ G, and for any two links ik, il ∈ Li(g
N\g). I complete the
proof of this step by showing that this implies convexity in own links. Let there be a
network g˜ ∈ N , a link ij 6∈ g˜ and set of own links {ij1, ..., ijm} = l˜i ⊆ Li(g
N\(g˜∪ij)).
Define a sequence of networks (g0, g1, ..., gm) such that g0 = g˜ and gk = g˜ ∪ (
k
∪
l=1
ijl)
for all k = 1, ...,m. Applying inequality (6) to every gk in the sequence, such that
k = 0, 1, ...,m− 1, we get:
mui(gk ∪ ij, ij)
(6)
≤ mui(gk ∪ ijk+1 ∪ ij, ij) = mui(gk+1 ∪ ij, ij), (7)
for all k = 0, 1, ...,m − 1. Since the inequality holds for every two consecutive
elements in the sequence, it holds especially for the first and last element (g0 = g˜
and gm = g˜ ∪ l˜i) in the sequence:
(7)⇒ mui(g˜, ij) ≤ mui(gm ∪ ij, ij) = mui(g˜ ∪ l˜i ∪ ij, ij)
which, again holds for all networks g˜ ∈ G, for all links ij 6∈ g˜ and l˜i ⊆ Li(g
N\(g˜∪ij)),
implying convexity in own links.
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(3)⇒ (1) We show this step similarly to step 3. By definition of concavity in own current
links we get
mui(g, li) ≤
∑
ij∈li
mui(g, ij), (8)
for all i ∈ N , for all g ∈ G and for any set of own current links li ⊆ Li(g). Letting
li = {ik, il} for any two links ij, ik ∈ Li(g), (8) implies:
mui(g, ik ∪ il) ≤ mui(g, ik) +mui(g, il). (9)
Rearranging (9) gives:
⇔ ui(g)− ui(g \ {ik, il}) ≤ ui(g)− ui(g \ ik) + ui(g)− ui(g \ il)
⇔ ui(g \ il)− ui(g \ {ik, il}) ≤ ui(g)− ui(g \ ik)
⇔ ui(g
′ ∪ ik)− ui(g
′) ≤ ui(g
′ ∪ ik ∪ il)− ui(g
′ ∪ il))
⇔ mui(g
′ ∪ ik, ik) ≤ mui(g
′ ∪ il ∪ ik, ik), (10)
with g′ := g \ {il, ik}. Equation (10) holds for all i ∈ N , for all g′ ∈ G, and for any
two links ik, il ∈ Li(g
N \ g′), and thus is equivalent to (6), completing the proof,
since (6) implies convexity in own links, as shown in step 3.
To show the analogous equivalences for concavity in own links one can simply invert all
“≤”-signs.
Proof of Lemma 2.
(1) Let C be an improvement cycle and suppose for all g ∈ C it holds that g /∈ Ga,
i.e. no link addition proof network is part of the improvement cycle C. Trivially
for all networks g /∈ Ga there exists an improvement path leading to a link addition
proof network: Take g /∈ Ga, then there exists by definition a link ij ∈ gN \ g such
that mui(g ∪ ij, ij) > 0 and muj(g ∪ ij, ij) ≥ 0. Thus the link can be added as
an improvement in the sense of improvement paths. If the new network is addition
proof, then we are done, otherwise there exists another link which can be added.
Hence, we can construct an improvement path that only involves the addition of
links. Because the number of links is finite, this process leads either to a link addition
proof network or eventually to the complete network, which is trivially addition
proof. Thus, C cannot be a closed cycle, since it does not contain an addition proof
network, implying that there exists an improving path to an addition proof network,
which is not contained in C.
(2) This part is completely analogous, since if no network in an improvement cycle
is deletion proof then there exists an improvement path which only involves link
deletion, leading eventually to an deletion proof network, e.g. the empty network.
Proof of Lemma 3.
(1) Let g ∈ Ga, and suppose the contrary of the proposition is true, i.e. suppose
there exists an improvement path from g to itself, labeled by (g1, ..., gm), such that
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g1 = gm = g. For any improvement path emanating from g, links can only be deleted
by assumption, since g ∈ Ga. Since (g1, ..., gm) is a cycle, there have to be links,
which are added along the improvement path. Let gk be the first network in the
improvement path, which is reached by adding a link from network gk−1. Label the
first link that is added along the sequence as ij. This link ij is either not contained
in g (i.e. is not part of the first network in the sequence) or is deleted along the
sequence. For h < k, define gh as the network in sequence such that is reached by
deleting the link ij from network gh−1 (set h = 1 if the link ij is not contained in
g), i.e. gh = gh−1 − ij or let h = 1 if ij 6∈ g. Since we assume that (g1, ..., gm)
is an improving path, we get 0 > mui(gh ∪ ij, ij) for at least one of the involved
players, if h ≥ 2. Furthermore, since g is assumed to be addition proof, we get either
0 ≥ mui(gh ∪ ij, ij) for both players or 0 > mui(gh ∪ ij, ij) for at least one of the
involved players if h = 1. Let l := gh \ gk−1, li := Li(gh \ gk−1) and l−i := l \ li. We
defined gk as the first network in the sequence that is reached by adding a link to
the predecessor. Hence, up to gk−1 links have only been deleted along the sequence.
Since h < k, we get thus gk−1 ∪ li ∪ l−i = gh. Now, since u satisfies convexity in own
links we get:
mui(gk−1 ∪ ij, ij) ≤ mui(gk−1 ∪ li ∪ ij, ij). (11)
Similarly by strategic complements,
mui(gk−1 ∪ li ∪ ij, ij) ≤ mui(gk−1 ∪ li ∪ l−i ∪ ij, ij). (12)
Notice that gk−1 ∪ li ∪ l−i = gh implying by (11) and (12): mui(gk−1 ∪ ij, ij) ≤
mui(gh ∪ ij, ij). But for mui(gh ∪ ij, ij) it holds that mui(gh ∪ ij, ij) < 0 for one
player or mui(gh ∪ ij, ij) ≤ 0 for both involved players. Hence the link is not
added along the improvement path, contradicting the supposition that there exists
an improvement cycle, where g ∈ Ga is part of.
(2) Similarly to (1), suppose that g ∈ Gd and the contrary of the proposition is true.
Take such an improvement path from g to itself, labeled by (g1, ..., gm) such that
g1 = gm = g. For any improvement from g, links can only be added by assumption.
Let gk be the first network in the sequence that is reached by deleting a link, say
gk = gk−1 − ij and let i be the player, such that mui(gk−1, ij) < 0. This link has
either been added along the improvement path or has initially been part of g. Let
h < k be such that gh = gh−1 + ij or let h = 1 if ij ∈ g. By definition of g and
improving paths, we get 0 ≤ mui(gh, ij). Since gk−1 is a reached by only adding links
from gh, let l = gk−1 \ gh be the set of links that are added. Let li = l ∩ Li(g
N) the
subset of those links, where player i is involved and l−i = l\ li the set of links, where
player i is not involved. By strategic complements and convexity, it holds that:
mui(gh, ij) ≤ mui(gh ∪ li, ij) ≤ mui(gh ∪ li ∪ l−i, ij) = mui(gk−1, ij), contradicting
the supposition that there exists an improvement cycle, where g ∈ Gd is part of.
Proof of Lemma 4.
(1) Let g ∈ Gd and consider a network g′ ⊆ g. Since g is link deletion proof, we have
for all links ij ∈ g : mui(g, ij) ≥ 0. Let l := g \ g
′, li := l ∩ Li(g
N) and l−i := l \ li.
Then we get by strategic substitutes and concavity for all ij ∈ G:
mui(g
′, ij) ≥ mui(g
′ ∪ li, ij) ≥ mui(g
′ ∪ li ∪ l−i, ij) = mui(g, ij) ≥ 0.
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(2) The proof is analogous, take g ∈ Ga, g′ ⊇ g. As above by substitutes and concavity
we get for all ij 6∈ g′ :
mui(g
′ ∪ ij, ij) ≤ mui(g ∪ ij, ij).
By g being addition-proof, it follows that g′ ∈ Ga.
Proof of Theorem 2.
(1) Suppose that the profile of utility functions satisfies concavity in own links and the
strategic substitutes property and exhibits no indifference. Suppose the contrary of
the proposition is true and there exist two networks g˜, gˆ ∈ G such that g˜ ⊂ gˆ and
g˜, gˆ ∈ PS(G). Let g˜ ⊆ g ⊆ gˆ. By Lemma 4, it holds that g ∈ Ga(G), since g ⊇ g˜
and g˜ ∈ PS(G). Furthermore, by Lemma 4, it holds that g ∈ Gd(G), since g ⊆ gˆ
and gˆ ∈ PS(G). Thus, g ∈ Ga(G) ∩ Gd(G) = PS(G). Since g˜ ( gˆ, there exists at
least one link ij ∈ gN such that g˜ ∪ ij ⊆ gˆ, implying that g˜ ∪ ij is pairwise stable.
Particularly it holds that mui(g∪ ij, ij) ≥ 0 and muj(g∪ ij, ij) ≥ 0. However, since
g˜ is also pairwise stable we have mui(g ∪ ij, ij) > 0 ⇒ muj(g ∪ ij, ij) < 0. Thus,
mui(g ∪ ij, ij) = muj(g ∪ ij, ij) = 0, contradicting that u exhibits no indifference.
(2), (3) Both statements follow directly from (1), since every network is a superset of the
empty network and every network is a subset of the complete network.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let u satisfy both the strategic complements and substitutes
property and anonymity. We show the proposition in 4 steps:
Claim 1: Under the above assumptions we get that mui(g, ij) = mui(gi, ij) for all i ∈ N ,
and for any network g ∈ G such that ij ∈ g, where gi is the ego-network of player i.
This is immediately implied since the profile of utility functions satisfies both the
strategic complements and substitutes property, that is it holds for all i ∈ N , for all
g ∈ G, for all l−i ∈ L−i(g
N \ g) and for all ij ∈ g that
mui(g, ij) = mui(g ∪ l−i, ij). (13)
Thus since g \ gi ⊆ L−i(g
N) the first claim follows by equation (13). In other words,
the marginal utility of any link ij in two networks g, g′ is the same as long as both
networks imply the same ego-network gi = g
′
i for player i.
Claim 2: Under the above assumptions, it holds that mui(g, ij) = mui(g, ik) for all players
i ∈ N , for all networks g ∈ G and for all links ij, ik ∈ g.
We have to show that in a given network g any two links of the network have the
same marginal utility. To proof this claim, consider the neighbors of players j and
k and let l1 := {kx /∈ g|x ∈ Nj(g)} be the set of links that k needs to add and
l2 := {jy /∈ gj|y ∈ Nk(g)} be the set of links j needs to add to make the set of
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neighbors of both players equal. Let g˜ = g∪ l1∪ l2. Note that l1, l2 ∈ L−i(g
N), since
ij, ik ∈ g, and for the sets of neighbors it holds that Nj(g˜) = Nk(g˜). Hence,
mui(g, ij)
(13)
= mui(g ∪ l
1 ∪ l2, ij)
(2)
= mui(g ∪ l
1 ∪ l2, ik)
(13)
= mui(g, ik) (14)
Equivalently, we also get mui(g ∪ ij, ij) = mui(g ∪ ik, ik), for all players i ∈ N , for
all networks g ∈ G and for all links ij, ik /∈ g.
Claim 3: Under the above assumptions, it holds that ui(g) = ui(g
′) for all players i ∈ N ,
for all networks g, g′ ∈ G such that g−i = g
′
−i and di(g) = di(g
′).
Let there be two networks g, g′ ∈ G such that g−i = g
′
−i and di(g) = di(g
′). Let
l1 := g \ g′ and l2 := g′ \ g. Note that l1, l2 ∈ Li(g), since g−i = g
′
−i and |l
1| = |l2|,
since di(g) = di(g
′). We prove the claim by induction over |l1| = |l2| = k.
k = 1: In this case only the link l1 (singleton set) needs to be cut and only the
link l2 needs to be added in order to move from g to g′. Thus by Claim 2 it
follows:
ui(g)− ui(g
′)
= ui(g)− ui(g \ l1) + ui(g \ l1)− ui((g ∪ l2 \ l1)) + ui((g ∪ l2 \ l1))− ui(g
′)
= mui(g, l1)−mui((g ∪ l2) \ l1, l2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(14)
= 0
+ui(g
′)− ui(g
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= 0
k → k + 1: Suppose the claim holds for all g, g′ ∈ G such that the assumptions
of the claim are satisfied and that |g \ g′| = |g′ \ g| = k. We show that it then
also holds for g˜ and g¯ such that the assumptions of claim 3 are satisfied and
|g˜ \ g¯| = |g¯′ \ g˜| = k + 1. Denote l1 := g˜ \ g¯ and l2 := g¯ \ g˜, and label the
links in l1 = {ij1, ..., ijk, ijk+1} and the links in l
2 = {im1, ..., imk, ijk+1} and
define the following network gˆ := (g ∪ {im1, ..., imk}) \ {ij1, ..., ijk}. Since the
proposition holds for k, we get ui(g˜) = ui(gˆ), since |g˜ \ g¯| = k. We get thus the
following :
ui(g˜)− ui(g¯) = ui(gˆ)− ui(g¯)
= ui(gˆ)− ui(gˆ \ ijk+1) + ui(gˆ \ ijk+1)
−ui((gˆ ∪ imk+1) \ ijk+1) + ui((gˆ ∪ imk+1) \ ijk+1)− ui(g¯
′)
= mui(gˆ, ijk+1)−mui((gˆ ∪ imk+1) \ ijk+1, imk+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(14)
= 0
+ui(g¯
′)− ui(g¯
′)
= 0.
Hence, ui(g) = ui(g
′) for all players i ∈ N , for all networks g, g′ ∈ G such that
g−i = g
′
−i and di(g) = di(g
′).
Claim 4: Under the assumptions above, then for any deletion proof g ∈ Gd it holds that
it is either pairwise stable or there exists an improving path to a pairwise stable network.
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Let g ∈ Gd be deletion-proof. Suppose that g is not stable (otherwise there is
nothing to show). Thus, there exists players (at least two), who want to add links
with other players. Construct a sequence of networks (gk)k=0,...,K such that g0 = g
and for all k = 1, ..., K it holds that gk := gk−1 + ij for some link ij /∈ gk−1, with
mui(gk−1 ∪ ij, ij) ≥ 0 and muj(gk−1 ∪ ij, ij) > 0 and let gK be the network where
no such link ij can be found. Clearly K must be finite, since there are only a finite
number of links. Also by construction gk defeats gk−1 for all k = 1, ..., K. We show
that in gK no player wants to delete a link, i.e. the marginal utility of any link
in gK is not negative. Take a link ij ∈ gK . We show that neither player i nor j
wants to cut the link. Suppose first that player i added a link in the improving
path (gk)k=0,...,K . Let gH be the network along the improving path where player i
added his last link, such that H := max {k ∈ {1...K}|gk = gk−1 ∪ im,m ∈ N} and
let im := gH \ gH−1 the last link that i added. Thus, gK \ gH ⊆ L−i(g
N), and hence:
mui(gK , ij)
(13)
= mui(gH , ij)
(14)
= mui(gH , im) ≥ 0.
Since im is added along the improving path, we get mui(gH , im) ≥ 0. If player i
did not add a link in the improving path, then gK \ g ⊆ L−i(g
N) and
mui(gK , ij)
(13)
= mui(g, ij) ≥ 0,
since g is by assumption deletion-proof. This shows the claim. Furthermore, since
for any deletion-proof g, there exists an improving path to a pairwise stable network,
g cannot be part of a closed improvement cycle. By Lemma 2, there cannot exist a
closed improvement cycle and hence there has to exist a pairwise stable network.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Suppose the empty network is not stable (otherwise there is nothing to show). Then there
exists at least one player i ∈ N such that mui(g
∅∪ij, ij) > 0 for some ij ∈ Li(g
N). Notice
that for all ik ∈ Li(g
N) this implies by anonymity :
mui(g
∅ ∪ ik, ik) > 0,
since gk = ∅ for all k ∈ N , and hence we get by PSC:
muk(g
∅ ∪ ik, ik) > 0.
Notice that for all k,m ∈ N this implies again by anonymity :
muk(g
∅ ∪ km, km) > 0. (15)
Claim 1: Under the assumptions above, if the empty network is not stable, then it holds
for all i ∈ N , for all li ⊂ Li(g
N) and for all ij ∈ Li(g
N \ li) that: mui(li ∪ ij, ij) > 0.
We show the claim by induction over |li|. Let |li| = 0, then 15 immediately implies
the claim.
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Now suppose the claim holds for all li ∈ Li(g
N) such that |li| = k. Let l˜i ∈ Li(g
N)
such that |l˜i| = k+1 and leave out some link im ∈ l˜i. Then for all ij ∈ Li(g
N \ (l˜i))
we get by strategic complements muj((l˜i \ im)∪ ij, ij) ≤ muj(l˜i ∪ ij, ij), since im /∈
Lj(g
N). Because we have |l˜i\im| = k, we get by assumption 0 < muj((l˜i\im)∪ij, ij),
and hence 0 < muj(l˜i ∪ ij, ij), implying 0 < mui(l˜i ∪ ij, ij) by PSC, which shows
the claim.
Claim 2: Under the assumptions above, if the empty network is not stable, then the
complete network is stable.
Assume the contrary, that the complete network and the empty network are not
pairwise stable. Since the complete network is not pairwise stable, there exists a
player i ∈ N and a link ij ∈ Li(g
N) such that mui(g
N , ij) < 0. Hence, for this
link we get by strategic complements mui(Li(g
N), ij) ≤ mui(g
N , ij) < 0, since
L−i(g
N) = gN \ Li(g
N). This, however, contradicts claim 1, since taking li :=
Li(g
N) \ ij, we get mui(li ∪ ij, ij) = mui(Li(g
N), ij) < 0. Hence the complete
network has to be pairwise stable, if the empty network is not pairwise stable.
Proof of Lemma 5. Both steps are trivial. Convexity in all links implies for all players
i ∈ N , for all networks g ∈ G, for any set of links l ∈ gN \ g, and for any link jk 6∈ g ∪ l
that mui(g ∪ jk, jk) ≤ mui(g ∪ l ∪ jk, jk). By simply restricting attention to the a set
of own links l ∈ Li(g
N \ g) and the marginal utility of a link jk ∈ Li(g
N \ (g ∪ li)),
convexity in own links immediately follows. Strategic complements captures the effect of
other links on marginal utility. Letting l ∈ L−i(g
N \ g) and comparing marginals of a
link jk ∈ Li(g
N \ (g ∪ li)) in the definition of convexity in all links implies the strategic
complements property.
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